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 A U.S. Department of Energy project to convert excess weapons-grade plutonium 
into fuel for commercial nuclear reactors to fulfill an international agreement with Russia 
is billions over budget and well over a decade behind schedule. This in and of itself is a 
problem, but the larger problem is that failure to complete the project endangers 
worldwide nonproliferation and disarmament efforts and leaves one of the biggest 
stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium unaddressed. This decision memo reviews several 
technical reports that have been conducted and recommends pursuing a new strategy to 
renegotiate the agreement with Russia to allow for the dilution and disposal of the excess 
plutonium at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico.  
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To: Department of Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz 
From: Senior DOE Staff   
Re: Disposing of Weapons-Grade Plutonium 
 
Action-Forcing Event 
 After extensive analysis, the Plutonium Disposition Red Team (“Red Team”) 
issued a final report laying out the technical and economic implications of two options for 
the United States to fulfill its commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus 
weapons-grade plutonium as agreed in 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition 
Agreement (PMDA) with Russia.1 The Department of Energy (DOE) must make a 
decision on how to proceed so that funding for the selected option can be correctly 
allocated in the Department’s budget submission to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and renegotiation of the Agreement with Russia can begin, if necessary. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 Under the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), the 
United States and Russia each committed to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess weapons-
grade plutonium.2 In the United States, “disposing” meant processing the plutonium into 
Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) that could be used to power commercial nuclear reactors, 
rendering waste that is much less easily repurposed into nuclear weapons. Originally 
scheduled for completion in September 2016 at an estimated cost of $1 billion, the MOX 
                                                          
1“Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department 
of Energy, August 2015. 
2 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian 
Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required 




project is an estimated 15 years away from completion and will cost $30 billion over the 
life of the project.3  
 The fact that the project is billions over budget and well over a decade behind 
schedule is a problem in and of itself. However, the larger problem is that failure to 
complete the project endangers worldwide nonproliferation and disarmament efforts and 
leaves one of the biggest stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium unaddressed. The 
Nuclear Threat Initiative advocacy group notes that, “From a nonproliferation standpoint, 
plutonium is of the greatest concern because only 8 kilograms are needed to make a 
nuclear bomb.”4 While the material is securely stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in 
South Carolina and other DOE facilities, the longer it remains in its unaltered state, the 
longer it remains a security threat. Moreover, even in the event that the project is finished 
and starts producing MOX fuel, there are currently no utilities who have definitively said 
that they will buy it to fuel their power plants.  
 
History 
 A 1994 report published by the National Academy of Sciences stated that the 
surplus of nuclear material resulting from the “many thousands of U.S. and Russian 
nuclear weapons [slated] to be retired” pursuant to the first and second Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaties and other commitments made by the United States and Russia 
represented a “clear and present danger to national and international security.”5 This 
danger was intensified by the “political and economic crises” that characterized the years 
                                                          
3 “Audit Report: Cost and Schedule of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River 
Site,” Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, May 2014, 2.  
4 Elena Sokova,“Plutonium Disposition,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 1, 2002.  




immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.6 It was in this context that the U.S. 
and Russia began exploring mutual means to secure and dispose of excess weapons-grade 
plutonium.  
 The 1994 National Academy of Sciences report explored three disposition 
options: spent fuel, vitrification and deep-borehole. The first option, spent fuel, involved 
mixing the excess plutonium with uranium to create MOX fuel that would then be used to 
power commercial nuclear reactors, resulting in waste that cannot easily be repurposed 
into nuclear weapons. The next option, vitrification, involved immobilizing the excess 
plutonium by encasing it in glass and burying it at a secure high-level waste site. In the 
third option, deep borehole, the waste is buried deep underground.  
Russia, viewing its’ “…excess plutonium as an asset that should be used to 
produce energy,” favored the spent fuel/MOX strategy.7 Moreover, Russia did not view 
“immobilization alone to be an acceptable approach because immobilization, unlike 
irradiation of MOX fuel, fails to degrade the isotopic composition of the plutonium,” 
meaning that, in Russia’s opinion, the waste could more easily be dug up by the United 
States and reused for nuclear weapons.8 The countries struck a compromise in the 
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), signed in September 2000: 
each country committed to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium, 
the U.S. took a hybrid approach, agreeing to dispose of 25.57 metric tons of plutonium 
material by MOX irradiation and 8.43 metric tons by immobilization, while Russia 
                                                          
6 “Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy of Sciences, 1994, 19.  
7 Anatoli Diakov, “Disposition of Excess Russian Weapon HEU and Plutonium,” Center for Arms Control, 
Energy and Environment Studies, February 2012, 5. 
8 Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 76 (April 19, 2002). Federal Register: The Daily 




agreed to dispose of all 34 metric tons of plutonium material by MOX irradiation. 9 
However, in April 2002, the Department of Energy announced that only one method of 
plutonium disposition could be supported with the funds available.10 To ensure Russia’s 
continued participation in the PMDA, DOE decided that it would only pursue the MOX 
approach.11 
In 1999, in anticipation of the U.S.-Russian agreement, the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the DOE, contracted 
with a consortium now known as CB&I AREVA MOX Services, LLC, to design, build 
and operate a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at the DOE-owned Savannah River 
Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina.12 At the time, the MFFF was estimated to cost $1 
billion to design and build and expected to begin operation in 2016.13  
Though often referred to as one facility, the MFFF originally consisted of three 
large projects: a Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), where nuclear 
weapons pits are disassembled and the resulting plutonium metal is converted into an 
oxide form; a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, to produce the MOX fuel for 
irradiation in domestic reactors; and a Waste Solidification Building to handle the waste 
from the MFFF.  [The PDCF, a “first-of-its-kind” facility in the United States, was 
                                                          
9Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian 
Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required 
for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, United States-Russia, September 2000.  
10 Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 76 (April 19, 2002). Federal Register: The Daily 
Journal of the United States. 
11 Ibid.  
12 “About the MOX Project,” CB&I Areva MOX Services, LLC. http://www.moxproject.com/about/, ND.  
13 Mark Holt and Mary Bet D. Nikitin, “Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: 




cancelled in June 2012 in an effort to slow increased costs after DOE determined that it 
could use existing facilities to perform this segment of the process.]14 
The Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization Act included a provision inserted at 
the behest of Senator Lindsay Graham (R-SC) stipulating that if the MFFF did not start 
processing at least one ton of plutonium a year by 2016 the Department of Energy must 
begin removing it from the state or pay up to $100 million in penalties annually for up to 
five years.15 In 2005, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a construction 
permit for work to begin at the MFFF. That same year, however, DOE reported in its FY 
2006 budget request what was to become the first of many delays due to a “disagreement 
with Russia over liability protection for contractor work performed in [Russia].”16 By 
July 2005, the estimated price tag had been revised to $3.5 billion.17 The liability issue 
was eventually resolved, but by the time construction at the Savannah River Site began in 
2007, the estimated cost had risen to approximately $4.7 billion, an increase that NNSA 
attributed to revisions to the original cost baseline and “underestimates of design costs 
and inflationary increases of the cost of materials during the time interval between project 
estimates.”18 The project suffered another blow in late 2008 when Duke Energy, the only 
utility that had agreed to test MOX fuel in two of its reactors, let its contract to buy MOX 
produced at the MFFF expire, due to concerns about cost and the availability of a steady 
                                                          
14 “Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus Weapon-Grade Plutonium 
Disposition Options,” U.S. Department of Energy, April 2014, 10.  
15 “Bob Stump Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,” (Section 3181 of P.L. 107-314 as 
amended by P.L. 112-239). 
16 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional 
Budget Request (Vol.1,534), February 2006. 
17 Mark Holt and Mary Bet D. Nikitin, “Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: 
Management and Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, March 2, 2015, 8. 
18  “National Nuclear Security Administration Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Budget Request (Volume 




fuel supply.19 Following Duke’s announcement, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 
a federally-owned utility, signed an Interagency Agreement with DOE to “investigate the 
potential for use of MOX fuel in TVA reactors.”20 Five years later, TVA continues to 
hedge on whether it can and will accept MOX.21 
In 2010, the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement was amended 
because the “Russian program set forth in 2000 proved incompatible with Russia’s 
nuclear energy strategy and was, thus, not financially viable.”22  The amended Protocol, 
which became effective on July 13, 2011, “laid out conditions for Russian use of the 
plutonium as fast reactor fuel, including restrictions on breeding additional plutonium in 
fast reactors,” and stipulated that both countries would begin disposition in 2018.23 But 
the 2018 target date quickly began to look overly ambitious for the United States. At the 
end of Fiscal Year 2012, the contractor submitted an updated baseline change proposal 
that increased the total project cost from $4.8 billion to $7.7 billion and pushed the start 
date from October 2016 to November 2019.24 NNSA’s FY 2011 – FY 2013 budget 
requests to Congress listed several chronic problems on the project that got progressively 
worse, including difficulty finding suppliers and subcontractors with sufficient technical 
and safety expertise and very high personnel turnover.  
                                                          
19 Bruce Henderson, “MOX fuel testing expires,” The Herald, March 20, 2009.  
20 “Potential Use of MOX in TVA Reactors Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement,” Tennessee 
Valley Authority, April 29, 2015. 
21 Dave Flessner, “TVA awaits decision on getting fuel made from surplus nuclear warheads,” Times Free 
Press, May 6, 2015.  
22 “2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement,” Office of the Spokesman,  U.S. Department 
of State, April 13, 2010. 
23 Mark Holt and Mary Bet D. Nikitin, “Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: 
Management and Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, March 2, 2015, 4. 
24  “National Nuclear Security Administration Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Budget Request (Vol. I),” 




The project’s fiscal situation did not improve and NNSA, while saying it 
remained “committed to the plutonium disposition mission,” sought to “slow down the 
MOX project” and other associated activities while it examined alternative methods in its 
Fiscal Year 2014 budget request.25 A Plutonium Disposition Working Group was tasked 
with reviewing the cost and feasibility of five disposition options, including the current 
MOX option. After reviewing the Working Group’s extensive assessment, DOE 
announced in its Fiscal Year 2015 budget request that, “Based upon ongoing analysis, [it 
had] determined that the MOX fuel approach is significantly more expensive than 
anticipated, even with consideration of potential contract restructuring and other 
improvements… due to these increases, the MOX fuel approach is not viable within 
available resources. As a result, MOX will be placed in cold standby while further 
studied. Upon selecting a preferred option, DOE will commission an independent 
assessment of the option.”26 The total lifecycle cost of the project was now an estimated 
$30 billion. The budget request went on to say that DOE would not meet the deadline to 
start processing at least one ton of plutonium by 2016, as directed in the Fiscal Year 2003 
Defense Authorization Act, and therefore had stopped transferring plutonium into South 
Carolina and stated that it would prepare a report for Congress on options for removing 
plutonium from the state.27 
 State leaders and South Carolina’s congressional delegation were up in arms. On 
March 18, 2014, the State of South Carolina filed a lawsuit to block DOE from putting 
                                                          
25 “National Nuclear Security Administration Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Budget Request (Vol. I),” 
U.S. Department of Energy, April 2013, DN-119. 
26 “National Nuclear Security Administration Fiscal Year 2015 Congressional Budget Request (Vol.1),” 
U.S. Department of Energy, March 2015, 527).  





the MFFF in cold standby. The Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act and 
Fiscal Year 2015 Further Continuing Appropriations Act each directed DOE to conduct 
independent assessments of the Plutonium Working Group report. $345 million was 
appropriated to continue construction at the MFFF and an explanatory statement barred 
the NNSA from placing the project in cold standby.  
 Concurrently, the Aerospace Corporation was tasked with conducting the 
independent assessment of the Working Group. Its “Phase 1” report examining 
disposition options – the MOX and dilute and dispose (also known as “down blend”) was 
published on April 13, 2015 and concluded that, “…even the best case scenario for the 
remaining MOX approach would be more expensive and riskier than the worst case 
scenario for the dilute and dispose approach, assuming that the latter approach is 
sufficient for compliance with the PMDA and is efficiently enabled in cooperation with 
the State of New Mexico.”28 Again, the South Carolina delegation contested the validity 
of the report. To quell the protests, the Department of Energy requested Thomas Mason, 
Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, assemble a “Red Team Review” to 
“[evaluate] and [reconcile] previous cost estimates of plutonium disposition options; 
[analyze] ways to modify the MOX fuel approach, specifically the MOX Fuel Fabrication 
Facility Protect, to reduce costs if feasible; and [examine] how different risk assumptions 
can impact the total lifecycle cost estimates.”29 
 
 
                                                          
28 “Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. 
Department of Energy, August 2015, xi.   
29 Memorandum from U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz to Oak Ridge National 





Current State of the Problem 
 The Red Team report found that in order for the MOX approach to be successful, 
“…annual funding for the whole program (MFFF plus other activities that produce feed 
material and support fuel licensing and reactor availability) would have to increase from 
the current ~$400 million per year to ~$700-$800 million per year over the next 2-3 
years, and then to remain at ~$700-$800 million per year until all 34 megatons are 
dispositioned (in FY15 dollars).”30 The report goes on to say that “The dilute and dispose 
option could be executed at approximately the current $400 million annual program 
funding level over roughly the same timeframe as the MOX approach.”31  
 The Department of Energy has adeptly sidestepped taking a position on whether 
or not to pursue the MOX strategy to plutonium disposition by insisting that alternative 
approaches needed to be fully evaluated before next steps could be taken. The Red Team 
has produced an authoritative report on the issue and it is time now to make a decision 
and move forward.  
 
Players/Actors 
- Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Duma and the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
- Secretary of State John Kerry  
- Senator Lindsay Graham (R-SC) 
                                                          
30 Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department 
of Energy, August 2015, x. 




o Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy 
and Water Development 
- Senator Tim Scott (R-SC) 
- Congressman Joe Wilson (R, SC-02) 
o Most of the Savannah River Site is in his district 
- Congressman Jim Clyburn (D, SC-06)  
o Assistant House Democratic Leader; House Democratic leadership 
liaison to the Appropriations Committee 
- South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley (R) 
- Senator Martin Heinrich (D-NM) 
o Member, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
- Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) 
o Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy 
and Water Development 
- Congressman Steve Pearce (R, NM-02) 
o Waste Isolation Pilot Project is in his district 
- New Mexico Governor Susan Martinez (R) 
- Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) 
o Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 
Senate Committee on Appropriations 
- Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) 
o Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Senate 




- Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) 
o Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
- Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA) 
o Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
 
Policy Proposal 
 Abandon the MOX effort in South Carolina and pursue the dilute and dispose 
approach, with final disposition at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New 
Mexico.  
 
Policy Authorization  
 Abandoning the MOX effort in favor of the dilute and dispose approach to 
plutonium disposition will require renegotiation of the Plutonium Management and 
Disposition Agreement (PMDA) with Russia. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land 
Withdraw Act of 1992 will also need to be amended to increase the statutory capacity for 
waste disposal at WIPP.32 
 
Policy Implementation  
 To implement this change in policy, the U.S. Department of State, with the 
assistance of the Department of Energy, would need to renegotiate of the PMDA with the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A renegotiated PMDA would need to be ratified by 
the Russian Duma. Congress would need to approve, and the President would need to 
                                                          




sign into law, an amendment expanding the storage capacity of the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant Land Withdraw Act of 1992. The State of New Mexico and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) would need to agree to issue the required environmental 
permits for expansion of waste disposal at WIPP. DOE and NNSA will need to move 
quickly to reopen WIPP and make it capable of accepting the additional waste safely and 
securely. The States of South Carolina and New Mexico and their congressional 
delegations will either need to agree to this policy proposal or their objections (and 
lawsuits) will need to be overcome. After each of these hurdles are overcome, full 
disposition of the 34 metric tons of the excess plutonium is estimated to cost 
approximately $400 million per year (in 2015 dollars) for 18 years.33 
 
Policy Analysis 
 The implications of changing course from a MOX approach and to the dilute and 
dispose method of plutonium disposition have been well-studied and the results have 
been remarkably similar. The positive aspects of pursuing the dilute and dispose method 
can be broadly categorized as listed below. The dilute and dispose method is:   
 
 Technologically simpler – The nation’s top nuclear waste and weapons 
experts assembled in the Red Team found that the “…risks associated with 
the dilute and dispose option are far lower than the MOX approach, since 
                                                          
33 Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department 




both the technology and the disposition process associated with Dilute and 
Dispose are far simpler;”34 
 
 Offers greater opportunities for efficiency - “Unlike the MOX 
approach, the dilute and dispose approach offers opportunities for the 
introduction of efficiencies which could reduce life cycle duration and 
cost, many of which could be implemented after the program is underway; 
35  
 
 Removes the significant risk that DOE will not be able to find a utility 
to use the MOX fuel -  “From a utility perspective, the risks to MOX fuel 
use are large and will potentially require a substantial price discount, 
perhaps to the point of being ‘free’ in the beginning to incentivize the 
utility to make modifications to their reactor and go through the NRC 
license amendments, to use fuel that is less optimum than their current 
fuel;”36 
 
 Likely to be accommodated by Russia - “The combination of evolving 
international circumstances and the fact that the U.S. has already 
                                                          
34 Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department 
of Energy, August 2015, xi. 
35 “Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus Weapon-Grade Plutonium 
Disposition Options,” U.S. Department of Energy, April 2014, 21. 
 
36 Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department 




accommodated a Russian national interest in a previous PMDA 
modification causes the Red Team to believe that the federal government 
has a reasonable position with which it enter PMDA negotiations” and, 37  
 
 Is significantly less expensive – As previously stated, the dilute and 
dispose approach can be executed at current funding levels (about $400 
million annually), whereas successful execution of the MOX approach 
would require doubling that number – something that is extremely 
unlikely in the very tight current budget environment that is expected to 
last for the foreseeable future.  
 
 While the potential positive implications of switching from a MOX to dilute and 
dispose approach to plutonium disposition have been found to be numerous, there is one 
major downside: successful execution is entirely dependent on the reopening and 
expansion of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Located outside Carlsbad, New 
Mexico, WIPP is the United States’ only facility for permanent storage of transuranic 
waste.38 In February 2014, two unrelated incidents took place: first, a salt truck caught on 
fire, and a few days later, low levels of airborne radioactive contamination were detected 
onsite.39 WIPP has not accepted waste for disposal since these two incidents, though 
DOE estimates that the facility will be restarted in mid-2016.40 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 “Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP),” EPA.gov, last modified October 29, 2015. 
39 “What happened at WIPP in February 2014,” wipp.energy.gov, last modified February 25, 2016. 





 While reopening WIPP is a short-term obstacle to implementing the dilute and 
dispose option, the greater challenge is expanding WIPP’s capacity. “The WIPP currently 
has a legislated capacity limit of 176,000 cubic meters and to date has emplaced about 
91,000 cubic meters. 66,000 cubic meters of the remaining 85,000 cubic meters is already 
subscribed by known transuranic (TRU) waste generators, leaving about 19,000 cubic 
meters for support of future TRU waste generators such as the plutonium disposition 
program.”41 But disposition could begin immediately as “…well over half of the entire 
dilute and dispose operation could be completed before facility expansion would be 
needed.” There are no substantive physical or technical constraints on expanding WIPP – 
the primary risks with this approach are political in nature.  
 
Political Analysis  
 The broader political implications to the Administration as a whole are limited as 
President Obama is serving the last year of his second term. But that does not mean the 
proposal to change plutonium disposition strategy from a MOX approach to a dilute and 
dispose approach can be made in a political vacuum. On one hand, even just making the 
decision to pursue the dilute and dispose option before the end of his Administration 
would be an accomplishment for President Obama, who in announced nuclear security 
and nonproliferation would be two of his main foreign policy focuses in a 2009 speech in 
Prague. On the other hand, though this Administration will soon be gone, the Department 
of Energy will remain and a miscalculation could have long-term political implications 
for the Department on Capitol Hill and hurt the Department’s legitimacy when it sites 
                                                          
41 Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department 




future projects. If a Republican wins the White House and Republicans maintain their 
majorities in Congress, that could give the mostly Republican South Carolina delegation 
leverage to retaliate against DOE if the dilute and dispose approach is selected. Within 
this context, a more granular look at the political pros and cons follows. 
 
Representative. Pearce and Senators Udall and Heinrich   
 The WIPP facility lies entirely within the congressional district of Representative 
Steve Pearce. It is an important economic asset to his district and New Mexico as a 
whole, employing approximately 200 miners and 300 “technically skilled workers.”42 In 
recent years, Pearce, fearful that a dwindling amount of DOE-generated waste would lead 
to lay-offs, has tried to amend the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdraw Act of 1992 
to allow WIPP to accept all federally-owned transuranic waste.43 Most recently, in 2013, 
an amendment he sponsored to permit this change was added to the Fiscal Year 2014 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that passed out of the House.44 While he has 
not specifically addressed the possibility of WIPP accepting down blended weapons-
grade plutonium, Rep. Pearce’s eagerness to allow WIPP to accept non-DOE produced 
waste indicates that he would be open to do so.  
 A spokeswoman for Senator Martin Heinrich at the time said that he supported 
Rep. Pearce’s amendment to the FY14 NDAA and noted that he had co-sponsored a 
similar proposal with Rep. Pearce when he was in the House.45 Senator Heinrich often 
                                                          
42 Todd Willens, “Statement to the Radioactive and Hazardous Materials Committee,” New Mexico 
Legislature, July 18, 2011. 
43 “Congressman Pearce Introduces Legislation to Protect WIPP,” Office of U.S. Congressman Steve 
Pearce press release, May 9, 2013. 
44 James Monteleone, “House passes Pearce amendment to expand WIPP’s role,” Albuquerque Journal, 
June 19, 2013. 




speaks highly of WIPP’s contribution to the nation’s security, saying in late 2014 that 
"Our nation's security relies heavily on the important work being done at WIPP. Not only 
is the facility an integral part of the environmental cleanup of Cold War programs at 
Department of Energy defense sites around the country, including Los Alamos, it also 
supports many jobs in New Mexico."46 Senate Democrats have a good chance of taking 
back the majority of the Senate in the upcoming election, which would allow Heinrich, a 
member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, to exert more influence 
– either in support of or opposition to – an expansion of WIPP.  
 Senator Tom Udall has also publicly praised WIPP as “pivotal to both our 
national security and our energy security.”47 However, as Attorney General of New 
Mexico in the early 1990s, Udall sued the Department of Energy to prevent the transfer 
of radioactive waste into WIPP.48 And Udall was publicly accused by Rep. Pearce of 
surreptitiously opposing his amendment to expand the type of waste WIPP can accept 
(which did not ultimately make it into the final version of the bill that became law).49  
 
State of New Mexico Local Host Communities  
 New Mexico, with both the local community and state actively advocating to host 
a storage site for high-level nuclear waste, embodies what the White House meant when 
it announced it would prioritize a “consent-base” approach to siting for nuclear waste.50 
                                                          
46 “Udall, Heinrich Announce $324 Million for WIPP Cleanup, Recovery,” Office of U.S. Senator Martin 
Heinrich press release, December 22, 2014. 
47 Ibid.  
48 State of NM Ex Rel. Udall v. Watkins, 783 F. Supp. 633 (D.D.C. 1992) 
49 Michael Coleman, “Pearce, Udall spar over WIPP measure,” Albuquerque Journal, December 11, 2013. 
50 “Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,” 




The state and local community have embraced its role as a site for nuclear waste and even 
lobbied for more disposal projects. 
 The City of Carlsbad, New Mexico, established a “Mayor’s Nuclear Task Force” 
to “advise Mayor [Dale] Janway on items of interest related to the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant and of opportunities for additional nuclear projects in the area.”51 The City’s home 
page proudly advertises that “In the 1970s, when other communities in the country were 
mechanically opposing any project with the word ‘nuclear’ in it, the residents of Carlsbad 
indicated an interest in getting more information about hosting a repository,” and, that 
“Because the [WIPP] project has gone so well, many Carlsbad residents are now open to 
the possibility of having additional nuclear projects in the regions remote salt beds.”52 
The city lobbied for adoption of Rep. Pearce’s amendment to expand the scope of TRU 
waste that WIPP can accept, and, immediately following the release recommendations of 
a congressional blue-ribbon panel on nuclear waste, city representatives traveled to 
Washington to reinforce WIPP’s “position as a potential site for future nuclear waste 
disposal.”53 Carlsbad’s county, Eddy County, joined with Lea County to form the Eddy-
Lea Energy Alliance, to promote the area as a site for interim nuclear waste storage.54 
The City of Carlsbad has itself spent more than $250,000 lobbying to host the site.55 
 At the state level, Republican Governor Susanne Martinez has also advocated for 
New Mexico as a potential interim storage site for the radioactive waste produced by 
                                                          
51 “About Us,” The Carlsbad Nuclear Nexus. http://www.carlsbadnuclearnexus.com/About_Us.html, ND. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Tom Schneider, “CDOD delegation discusses nuclear issues in Washington,” Current-Argus City, 
October 1, 2009. 
54 “Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance,” Eddy-Lea Energy Alliance, http://www.eddyleaenergyalliance.com/, ND. 





nuclear power plants.56 In an April 10, 2015, letter to the Department of Energy, 
Governor Martinez touted southern New Mexico as an ideal storage site, writing that “In 
one of the most remote areas of the state, they have had the ingenuity and fortitude to 
carve out a niche in the nuclear industry to broaden their economic base.”57 Martinez’s 
willingness to advocate for her state to host high-level nuclear waste site indicates that 
she would be open to expanding WIPP to accept down blended plutonium from 
disassembled nuclear weapons. While she will leave office at the end of 2018 (she is 
term-limited), she could probably set the state environmental permitting process in 
motion prior to her departure (expanding WIPP will require a Resources Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit for hazardous wastes from the New Mexico 
Department of the Environment).58 
 
Senators Graham and Scott; Congressmen Clyburn and Wilson; and the State of South 
Carolina 
 As senior legislators sitting in positions of committee and party power, Senator 
Lindsay Graham (R-SC) and Representative Jim Clyburn (D-SC) are perhaps the most 
formidable obstacles of scrapping the MOX plant in favor of the dilute and dispose 
approach. Senator Graham has been the most vocal opponent and has twice wielded his 
power as a member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water 
Development to prevent the Administration from putting MOX in “cold standby.” He is 
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adamant that the MOX project continue as planned despite the cost overruns and delay, 
saying “We made a promise to South Carolina and really, the world, to dispose of this 
material through MOX. There is no viable alternative. There have been some cost 
overruns that need to be dealt with, but I don’t see an alternative that is cheaper or 
practical.”59 South Carolina’s junior senator, Senator Tim Scott (R-SC), has let Senator 
Graham take the lead on this issue, given his place on the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, and has echoed Graham’s sentiments.  
 Congressman Jim Clyburn (D, SC-06) has been less vocal in his opposition to the 
Administration’s efforts than Senators Graham and Scott but is nonetheless opposed and, 
as Assistant House Democratic Leader and the House Democratic leadership liaison to 
the House Appropriations Committee, is in a position to prevent a shift in strategy on 
plutonium disposition. Most of the Savannah River Site lies in the congressional district 
of Representative Joe Wilson (R, SC-02). Like Senator Graham, Congressman Wilson 
has been a vociferous opponent of abandoning the MOX effort but, unlike Graham, is not 
an appropriator.  
 
State of South Carolina  
  Like their congressional delegation, the state of South Carolina has been dogged 
in its efforts to thwart a change in the plutonium disposition strategy to anything but 
MOX. As previously mentioned, South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson filed a 
lawsuit in March 2014 to block the Department from putting the MFFF in cold standby, 
                                                          




as the Department requested in its FY15 budget request. Following the release of the Red 
Team report, Attorney General Wilson again wrote to the Department, “with the support 
of [South Carolina’s] Congressional, State and local representatives,” notifying the 
Department of “potential litigation” should a decision be made to scrap the MFFF.60  
 As Attorney General Wilson noted in his letter, he has the full support of 
Republican Governor Nikki Haley. Haley has repeatedly said that the MOX plant is “…a 
promise made to those people [the MFFF employees] and it was a promise made to the 
state of South Carolina,” and made clear that cancelling the plant would elicit a fight 
from the state, saying “It’s only right that we turn around and we show D.C. you can’t 
break promises with the people of South Carolina.”61 
 
Capitol Hill  
 By and large, the major players on this issue on the Hill, aside from the South 
Carolina delegation, have been Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water 
Development Chairman Lamar Alexander (R-TN) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA); Senate 
Energy & Natural Resources Chairman Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and Ranking Member 
Maria Cantwell (D-WA), and House authorizers and appropriators have not definitively 
weighed in on the subject.  Oversight of three big Department projects plagued with 
cost-overruns and delays, including the MOX plant, have been a priority for Senators 
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Alexander and Feinstein.62 Senator Alexander was the one who originally pushed for the 
“Red Team” report, so it is likely that he will, at a minimum, give heavy weight to its 
recommendations to end the MOX program in favor of dilute and dispose. For her part, 
Senator Feinstein has expressed concern with the implications of breaking the PMDA 
agreement, saying that “…it presents a huge dilemma to this country in terms of keeping 
its word in agreements, and particularly with a very powerful country that is at sixes and 
sevens with us and everybody else.”63 However, more recent comments indicate that she 
is becoming more amenable to a change in strategy, saying “The goal of disposing of 
weapons-grade plutonium is certainly worthy, but the cost is enormous.”64 It is important 
to note that neither Senator Alexander nor Senator Feinstein have outright rejected the idea 
of ending the MOX project to switch to a dilute and dispose method with final disposition 
at WIPP. This fact, along with their public acknowledgement of the increasing budget-
busting price estimates of the project, indicates that they are willing to stand firm against 
fellow subcommittee member Lindsay Graham’s demands to keep the project going.  
 
Recommendation  
 Based on the evidence provided, the author recommends adopting the policy 
proposal to abandon the MOX effort in South Carolina and pursue the dilute and dispose 
approach, with final disposition at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New 
Mexico. The world has changed much since the decision was made to pursue the MOX 
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approach to plutonium disposition. First, down blending was not available at the time but 
has since been successfully demonstrated in the United States (surplus plutonium oxide 
materials from other Department facilities have been disposed at WIPP).65 Second, 
threats to our national security have changed. The Red Team report notes that 
“Nonproliferation policy has been increasingly focused on potential threats from non-
state actors, which increases the sense of urgency for timely disposition and potentially 
offers greater flexibility in the final form of the material to prevent future use.”66 Disposal 
of weapons-grade plutonium at WIPP can be done much faster than it can be processed at 
the yet-to-be finished MOX facility. Over a dozen former arms negotiators and diplomats 
reinforced this point in a September 2015 letter to DOE, writing that “DOE can uphold its 
obligation to safely dispose of this material [weapons-grade plutonium] without 
implementing the MOX program. More important, in addition to saving money, ending 
the current MOX program would be in the nation’s national security interest.”67 The 
PMDA will need to be renegotiated even if we continue on the current MOX path, as we 
will not meet the deadlines already laid-out. Finally, the government’s fiscal situation has 
changed dramatically and we can no longer afford to justify using MOX to dispose of 
excess plutonium when another approach will accomplish the same goals in a shorter 
time period at about half the lifetime cost. As previously noted, there are no technical 
obstacles to switching to a dilute and dispose method. There are some policy and political 
challenges, but the author believes that they can be overcome.  
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